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EXTRAPOLATION IN WARRANTY, STRICT
LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE
In the past decade, products liability law has developed an
amorphous basis for recovery against automobile manufacturers
known as "crashworthiness" actions These suits result from defects
in the design and construction of motor vehicles that enhance
injuries after the occurrence of a collision Actionable injuries
result when inertia hurls an occupant of a vehicle involved in a
primary collision against an unsafe interior structure producing a
harmful "second collision."3 Injuries intensified by the uncrash-
worthy nature of the vehicle itself-its inability to withstand a
collision and protect its occupants-are a basis for recovery against
the manufacturer." Many of these defects that produce second col-
lision injuries or injuries resulting from the uncrashworthy nature
of the automobile also cause injuries and fatalities in aircraft acci-
dents.' Although crashworthiness actions have not been successfully
asserted against aircraft manufacturers to date, an examination of
the various theories of recovery employed against automobile man-
ufacturers reveals that crashworthiness actions are a potential threat
to the aircraft manufacturer as well.
Commentators on air safety frequently dismiss discussion of
aviation crashworthiness suits reasoning that aviation accidents
cannot be survived regardless of the safety precautions employed.!
This peremptory dismissal is unwarranted. Although there were
194 passenger deaths in air carrier crashes and 1,322 deaths in
general aviation accidents in the United States in 1971,' investi-
gations revealed that deaths frequently resulted from uncrash-
worthy airplanes and second collisions rather than the initial im-
' See Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972).
2Id.
3Katz, Negligence in Design: A Current Look, 1965 INS. L.J. 5, 11 (1965).
'Annot., supra note 1, at 571-78.
'Compare Annot., supra note 1, with notes 6-9 infra.
6H. HAEKSTRA, SAFETY IN GENERAL AVIATION 72-77 (1971).
THotz, Accident Rate Down, Fatalities Up, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY,
Jan. 24, 1972, at 54.
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pact of the crash. Statistics show that aviation accidents occur for
the greater part during arrivals and departures at an airport when
the airplane is relatively close to the ground. Therefore, crashes
occurring during arrivals and departures would not necessarily
produce an impact fatal to all occupants. Hazards created by fire,
toxic gasses released from burning upholstery, blocked exits, up-
rooted seats and lack of adequate seat belts constitute the major
contributors to death in both large and small aircraft.'
The Federal Aviation Administration has recognized that mar-
ket incentives alone are not sufficient to insure that the socially
optimum degree of safety will be designed and built into the air-
craft." Under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,11 the Federal
Aviation Administrator is given the duty to promulgate minimal
standards of safety for all flights within the United States, its terri-
tories and possessions." Comprehensive changes in the Adminis-
trator's regulations relating to the crashworthy standards of wide-
bodied jets were a direct result of airline accident fatalities and
injuries occuring from inadequate safety features or excessive flam-
mability of cabin materials." These rules only outline the minimal
standards required for a certificate of airworthiness, they do not
preclude a suit against the manufacturer based on crashworthiness.
Amendments to Part 121 of the Certification and Operation
Rules" require: the installation of interior emergency lighting to
illuminate emergency exits for at least ten minutes during crit-
ical ambient conditions after an emergency landing," the install-
ment of both shoulder harnass and seat belt retention devices"
and the installment of galley equipment that can be secured during
'V. LOWELL, AIRLINE SAFETY IS A MYTH 33-40 (1967).
' Nader, Yes, It Is Safe to Fly, But Is It Safe to Crash?, HOLIDAY, July, 1969,
at 56-57.
"8See Borcherding, Liability in Law, 60 AM. Eco. REV. 946 (Dec. 1970).
The ideal state is reached when the marginal social value of resources devoted
to accident prevention is equal to the marginal social benefits of the increased
safety.
"Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 55
1301-1542 (1970).
1249 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1970).
"3 Woolsey, FAA Adopts Tighter Safety Standards, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH-
NOLOGY, Mar. 6, 1972, at 23.
14 Aeronautics and Space, 14 C.F.R. S 121 (1973).
"51d. at S 121.310(d)(3).
'ld. at § 121.311.
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take-off and landing." Also, all carry-on baggage must be placed
beneath the seat unless an overhead enclosed space is provided."8
Additional new rules are designed to expedite passenger escape
after an accident, minimize the effects of the impact and eliminate
fire hazards." Adequate exits must also be provided that can be
opened within ten seconds after the collapse of one or more of
the landing gear legs" and escape routes from the wing area must
be covered with slip-resistant surfaces."' Finally, all interior mate-
rials used for furnishing and decorating the passenger cabins and
crew compartments must meet more rigid flammability standards.
Interest in the safety features of aircraft operating in general
aviation has not received the extensive consideration given com-
mercial aircraft. Amendments to the federal air regulations in
1969, however, do require applicants for airworthiness certifica-
tion to provide each occupant of an aircraft with protection from
head injuries by installing either safety belts and shoulder har-
nasses, or safety belts plus an energy absorbing rest that would
support arms, shoulders, head and spine or by eliminating all po-
tentially injurious objects within the striking radius of the head
and simultaneously installing safety belts.' The FAA has recently
examined the problem of crashworthiness in small planes and is
contemplating requiring interiors to be free of potential injury-
causing devices and be equipped with shoulder harnasses.M
In the absence of precise judicial precedents or legislative ex-
pressions, crashworthinesss actions against aviation manufacturers
derive their greatest support from cases involving automobile man-
ufacturers. Jurisdictions have not uniformly decided crashworth-
iness suits, but many have imposed liability when the damages
could have been avoided or mitigated if the manufacturer had
utilized a vehicular design of different size, shape, construction or
assembly.' This liability has been imposed regardless of whether
17 Id. at 5 121.576.
18 Id. at 5 121.589.
" Id. at S 121.310.
20 Id.
" Id. at S 121.310(h)(2).
22Id. at S 121.312.
23Aeronautics and Space, 14 C.F.R. S 23.785 (1973).
'See 38 Fed. Reg. 2985 (1973).
" See Annot., supra note 1.
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the injury producing defect caused the initial accident. In these
situations, three theories have been successfully advanced to allow
recovery: (i) breach of express and implied warranties, (ii) strict
liability based on section 402A of the Restatement (2d) of Torts
and (iii) negligence in design.
I. BREACH OF WARRANTY
A limited number of automobile crashworthiness actions have
relied on breach of warranty theories." The most successful of
these theories is an action for breach of an express warranty. The
Uniform Commercial Code provides that an express warranty will
be deemed to have been given when any affirmation of fact or
promise is made by the seller or any description of the goods or
any sample or model is made a "basis of the bargain."" The Uni-
form Commercial Code thus interprets affirmations or representa-
tions made by the seller in advertisements, brochures or other
media designed to induce a purchase of the product to be an
express warranty. The seller is not required to use the word "war-
rant" or "guarantee" to create an express warranty," but the affir-
mation or promise must become a "basis of the bargain"; i.e. the
buyer must rely on the seller's statements. Recovery has been per-
mitted in a second collision injury suit when alleged shatter-proof
glass used in the windshield of a vehicle shattered in violation of
an express warranty and caused severe injury to the purchaser."
Express warranties that the roof of an automobile was constructed
of a solid sheet of metal were held breached when the purchaser
was severely injured in a collision by a jagged seam in the roof
28 See Annot., supra note 1, at 578.
2'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313(1).
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the
buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the
goods shall conform to the sample or model.
28UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-313(2).
21 Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090 (1934).
directly over the driver's seat of the vehicle." It is significant to
note that these breach of express warranty suits were the earliest
crashworthiness actions maintained. Their success is attributable
to the contractual nature of the warranty and the familiar remedy
of recovery for consequential damages for breach of a significant
term of the contract.
When no express warranty has been made, two possibilities
exist for crashworthiness actions based on breach of an implied
warranty: breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose 1 and breach of an implied warranty of merchantability
that the product is fit for the ordinary purpose for which the goods
are used." The breach of implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose is brought under section 2-315 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Comment 1 under this section indicates that
the creation of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular pur-
pose is basically a question of fact." Proof is required of the
buyer's reliance on the manufacturer's skill in furnishing automo-
biles appropriate for the particular purpose of becoming involved
in collisions, a rather onerous burden. Implied warranties for a
particular purpose may arise when the seller has selected the goods
sold to a buyer who has first expressed his particular needs or in
situations when the seller has reason to know of the buyer's par-
ticular purpose from the surrounding circumstances.' Under this
type of implied warranty, the basic factual issues will involve the
degree of the seller's knowledge of the particular purpose involved
and the degree of the buyer's reliance on the warranty.'
An action based on an implied warranty of merchantability that
the product is fit for the ordinary purposes for which the goods
3
°Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939).
s UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-315.
'UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-314.
SUNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 2-315, comment 1. Whether or not this
warranty arises in any individual case is basically a question of fact to be deter-
mined by the circumstances of the contracting. Under this section the buyer need
not bring home to the seller actual knowledge of the particular purpose for which
the goods are intended or of his reliance on the seller's skill and judgment, if the
circumstances are such that the seller has reason to realize the purpose intended
or that the reliance exists. The buyer, of course, must actually be relying on the
seller.
343 M. BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE, SALES AND BULK
TRANSFERS UNDER UCC S 7.02[3] (1972).
w Id.
19731 NOTES
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are used is the usual warranty involved in a products liability suit."
Section 2-314 of the Uniform Commercial Code contains six ex-
amples clarifying the meaning of "merchantable."" The example
most frequently used states that: "Goods to be merchantable must
be at least such as are fit for the ordinary purposes for which
such goods are used."8 This interpretation of "merchantable" was
applied in Friend v. General Motors' to permit recovery against
the manufacturer in a crashworthiness action. In Friend, seats
secured by only one bolt collapsed when the truck left the high-
way and struck a culvert. The impact of the vehicle against the
culvert moved the load in the rear of the truck forward and
caused the seats to fold over and injure the driver and his pas-
senger. A Georgia statute4 0 reciting that the manufacturer of a
motor vehicle impliedly warranted that it was merchantable, rea-
sonably suited to the use intended and free of known but undis-
closed and latent defects provided a presumption of merchantabil-
ity that facilitated plaintiff's burden of proof. The resolution of a
crashworthiness suit brought under an implied warranty of mer-
chantability depends to a great extent on whether automobile colli-
sions constitute an ordinary purpose for which the goods are used.
This determination is indigenous to any particular jurisdiction and
is somewhat related to the "intended use" of the vehicle discussed
later in this note.'
"See R. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY 5 16.04[2][d] (1960).
"UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE S 2-314(2).
Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract descrip-
tion; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality with-
in the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are
used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agree-
ment may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
88Id. at (c).
"Friend v. General Motors Corporation, 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734
(1968), cert. denied, 225 Ga. 290, 167 S.E.2d 926 (1968).
4
°Ga. Laws S 96-307 (repealed 1957).
"' See notes 69-82 infra.
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Actions based on express or implied warranties must comply
with the particular jurisdiction's requirement of privity of con-
tract." Traditionally, privity was required in actions based on
warranty because it was believed that one who made representa-
tions to effectuate a sale should not be held responsible for resul-
tant losses sustained by a stranger to whom the affirmations were
not made." When the express warranty has been conveyed to the
public through mass advertising techniques, however, the tradi-
tional view of the privity requirement is less convincing. Neverthe-
less, several jurisdictions" have refused to permit recovery in crash-
worthiness suits based on warranty theories when the injured party
was not in privity of contract with the manufacturer or seller of
the vehicle.
As a practical matter, it is difficult to base a second collision
action on implied warranties because most sales contracts for new
cars limit the extent of these warranties to the replacement of
defective parts." The disclaimer is subject to deletion from the
contract," however, if it can be proved unconscionable in view of
the circumstances surrounding the sale. To be effective, disclaimers
of warranty must be clear and unambiguous;, moreover, a dis-
claimer will not be effective unless it is likely to come to the
buyer's attention before the completion of the sale.' Also, dis-
claimers of warranty or of liability for negligence bind only the
parties to the transaction."
The success of a crashworthiness action against a producer of
an aircraft based on breach of express or implied warranties de-
pends principally on the type of warranty and the jurisdiction in-
volved. Actions based on a breach of an express warranty of a
safety aspect of the aircraft would be the most likely to succeed
if there were the requisite privity of contract. Actions based on
42 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 7.03[2] (1971).
"Id. at S 7.03[1] (1971).
4See Murphy v. Plymouth Motor Corp., 3 Wash.2d 180, 100 P.2d 30 (1940);
Chanin v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 89 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1937); Dyson v. General
Motors Corporation, 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Shumard v. General
Motors Corporation, 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
41 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 7.03[4] (1971).
4' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-316, 2-719, and 2-719, comment 1.
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an implied warranty of merchantability will offer a strong basis
for recovery if the requisite privity is found and the jurisdiction
considers an uncrashworthy plane an unmerchantable product; i.e.
it is not fit for the ordinary purpose for which aircraft are normally
used. The implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose will
succeed only if the requisite facts showing the seller's knowledge
of the particular purpose involved and the buyer's reliance on the
seller's selection of the aircraft to meet that particular purpose
are adequately proven. Implied warranty actions of fitness for a
particular purpose are somewhat unrealistic in the context of buyers
and sellers of aircraft, but express warranty and implied warranty
of merchantability actions have a strong legal basis.
II. STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT
Crashworthiness suits have also been maintained on concepts
of strict liability in tort under section 402A of the Restatement
(2d) of Torts." The elements of proof required to sustain an action
brought under this section are: (i) defective product unreasonably
dangerous, (ii) existence of the defect when the product left the
manufacturer, (iii) injury and (iv) cause in fact." In theory, a
person who is in the business of selling specific products should
be held strictly liable when the product reaches the consumer
without a substantial change from the condition in which it was
sold and injury results from an unreasonably dangerous defect
created before the product left the hands of the seller."'
The decisive issue in strict liability suits is whether there is
"*RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
our to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the consumer or user without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of
his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the other.
51 Id.
5 1 L. KREINDLER, AVITION ACCIDENT LAw § 7.04[l] (1971).
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"a defective product unreasonably dangerous." 3 The criteria for
answering this issue are similar to those used in determing whether
a particular conduct is negligent."4 Recovery against the manufac-
turer of a vehicle for enhanced injuries caused by collapse of the
roof of a vehicle when it overturned was permitted under the Penn-
sylvania law of both negligence and strict liability. The federal
district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania explained
that the essence of the issues was practically identical in determin-
ing the possible liability of the manufacturer under general negli-
gence principles and under the strict liability concepts of section
402A of the Restatement. The primary issue of whether the manu-
facturer should have designed the roof of its hard-top model to
support the weight of the automobile when overturned was con-
sidered within guidelines established by the exercise of due care
and the care required to avoid creating an unreasonably dangerous
product. In conjunction with this primary issue, two sub-issues were
considered: (i) whether, for purposes of negligence, the manufac-
turer was under any legal obligation to provide protection against
this kind of hazard when considering the foreseeability of the risk
and (ii) whether, under section 402A, rollover accidents are within
the contemplated normal use of the product. Reasoning that acci-
dents are commonplace and should thus be considered a foresee-
able misuse incident to the normal and intended use of the motor
vehicle, the Pennsylvania court refused to view narrowly the scope
of the manufacturer's duty or the contemplated use of the product.
Other courts, however, have declined to find the manufacturer
liable in similar casesa
The final determination of whether a defective product is un-
reasonably dangerous cannot be easily concluded by application
of a precise rule. A flexible standard that affords a balancing
between the utility of the risk and its magnitude produces a more
equitable result for both the manufacturer and the injured party."7
Factors that are helpful in making this determination are: (i) the
usefulness and desirability of the product, (ii) availability of sub-
" See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L. J. 5, 17 (1965).
5Id.
"1298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
5See Annot., supra note 1, at 583.
"7 See note 53 supra.
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stitutes, (iii) likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, (iv)
obviousness of the danger, (v) common knowledge and normal
public expectation of the danger, (vi) avoidability of the injury
by care in the use of the product and (vii) ability to eliminate
the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product
or making it too expensive."
If a jurisdiction has adopted section 402A of the Restatement
(2d) of Torts 9 and follows an expansive view of a manufacturer's
duty that would permit a finding that an uncrashworthy airplane
is a "defective product unreasonably dangerous," then strict lia-
bility could be an effective basis for aviation crashworthiness
actions. Strict liability is preferable to warranty actions because
no contract is involved; therefore, disclaimers" and privity require-
ments"t are not applicable. Strict liability has been applied to re-
mote purchasers, users, consumers, passengers and even bystand-
ers."5 Also, under section 402A, contributory negligence is not a
defense to recovery although a voluntary and unreasonable en-
counter of a known danger is considered an assumption of the
risk that may serve as a defense to recovery.' One of the primary
reasons for imposing strict liability is to insure that costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are born by the manufacturer
who placed the products on the market rather than the injured
persons who are powerless to protect themselves." Aviation crash-
worthiness situations illustrate the fulfillment of this purpose be-
cause in no other situation imaginable is the injured passenger so
helpless and the designer and manufacturer so influential in pre-
venting injuries.
III. NEGLIGENCE IN DESIGN
Crashworthiness suits based on negligence in design have been
38 Id.
"'See Maloney, Current Trends In Aviation Products Law, 36 J. AIR L. &
COM. 514, n.35A (1970), for analysis of strict liability jurisdictions.
"OVandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391
P.2d 168 (1964); Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App.2d 19, 214 N.E.2d
347 (1966); Arrow Transportation Co. v. Freuhauf Corp., 289 F. Supp. 170
(D. Ore. 1968).
I' 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW 5 7.04[4] (1971).
"Id. at § 7.04[3].
"See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
41 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 7.04[1] (1971).
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argued with frequent success."5 Applying this theory, a plaintiff
can recover by proving four factors: (i) a duty of the manufac-
turer to use due care in design to make the vehicle reasonably
safe when involved in collisions, (ii) breach of this duty, (iii)
harm suffered by the plaintiff and (iv) causation between the
breach of the duty and the harm incurred." Courts in several
jurisdictions, however, have refused to recognize a manufacturer's
duty as a matter of law and favor instead the court's reasoning in
Evans v. General Motors Corporation.' The Seventh Circuit in
Evans declared that a duty to guard against collisions can only be
established by the legislature and not by the courts. The facts in
Evans involved a negligent design suit in which plaintiff claimed
that the use of "X" frames"8 in automobile construction is a breach
of the manufacturer's duty to provide protection from vehicle col-
lapse in lateral collisions. Finding for the manufacturer, the Seventh
Circuit relied on Campo v. Scofield' and held that the manufac-
turer was not obligated to make accident proof vehicles or take
precautions against the obvious dangers of automobile collisions."'
A manufacturer has a duty to design his product to be reasonably
fit for the purposes for which it was made; the Seventh Circuit
took a restrictive view of this purpose stating:
The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its par-
ticipation in collisions with other objects despite the manufacturer's
ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions might occur.'
The majority rejected plaintiff's theory requiring General Motors
to foresee the possibility of broadside collisions and design accord-
ingly. Inferentially, the majority accepted General Motor's theory
that only required it to design vehicles that are reasonably fit for
the purpose for which they were made, without hidden defects
rendering them dangerous to persons properly using them.
"See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
"W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
67 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
" More recent automobiles were constructed with perimeter frames that could
better withstand the impact of a lateral collision and thus better protect the occu-
pants.
" 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950).
70 359 F.2d at 824.
71 Id. at 825.
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The dissent in Evans"' criticized the majority because its opinion
did not affirmatively state what an automobile manufacturer's
duty is in regard to design. The dissenting justice succinctly stated
his view of the manufacturer's duty:
The manufacturer's duty [is] to use such care in designing its auto-
mobiles that reasonable protection is given purchasers against
death and injury from accidents which are expected and foresee-
able yet unavoidable by the purchaser despite careful use.73
The expansive concept of the manufacturer's duty, voiced by
the dissent in Evans, was followed two years later by the Eighth
Circuit in another crashworthiness suit, Larsen v. General Motors
Corporation.'4 The Eighth Circuit in Larsen reasoned that the
manufacturer's duty of design was to use reasonable care under
the circumstances to so design its product, not to make it accident
or fool-proof, but to make it safe for the use for which it is in-
tended."2 According to Larsen, this duty includes a duty to design
the product so that it will fairly meet any emergency during use
that can reasonably be anticipated."0 The manufacturer under the
Larsen rationale, however, is not an insurer that his product is
incapable of producing injury because of its design. Rather, Larsen
stands for the proposition that the issue of permitting recovery
for a design defect that enhances or causes injury without causing
the accident depends specifically on the proper interpretation of
"intended use." 7 The expanded interpretation of "intended use"
employed in the Larsen case is based on three factors: (i) auto-
mobiles are made for use on highways, (ii) their "intended use"
cannot be carried out without encountering impacts and (iii) the
manufacturer should not be allowed to say that he does not intend
his product to be involved in collisions when he can easily foresee
that the probability of involvement is high."
The rationale of Larsen, represents a current trend and has been
applied in diverse fact situations. Recovery has been permitted for
72 Id.
73 Id. at 827.
74391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
"391 F.2d at 500.
76Id.
77391 F.2d at 501.
78 Id. at 502.
426
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the absence of rear guards on large trucks that could prevent
injury to occupants of smaller vehicles if they were to run beneath
the truck's wheels."' Other cases have acknowledged the manu-
facturer's liability for sharply protruding ashtrays," seat collapse
caused by shifting cargo,81 failure to use proper seat lock mech-
anisms on a split bench seat," use of defective material as a safety
knob on a gear shift lever" and dangerous placement and explosive
nature of gas tanks."
The reasoning of the Evans decision, although in the minority,
is also well substantiated. The Montana Supreme Court in Ford v.
Rupple"' denied recovery for second collision injuries reasoning
that the manufacturer did not owe a duty of reasonable care in
design to passengers in an automobile that went out of control
when side-swiped. The Montana court discussed both the Evans
79 Mieher v. Brown, 2 CCH 1972 PROD. LIA. REP. 5 6752 (1972).
'QFord Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959). An automobile
guest's action was sustained against the manufacturer of the automobile for loss
of sight in one eye as a result of plaintiff's slamming his head against the dash-
board and an allegedly defective ashtray when the driver had to stop suddenly
to avoid striking another vehicle.
81 Friend v. General Motors Corporation, 118 Ga. App. 763, 165 S.E.2d 734
(1968). The decision to permit recovery was based predominantly on an issue of
merchantability, but the court discussed the "use intended" as meaning the use for
which the article was manufactured and commonly intended by the manufacturer.
Thus, without expressly acknowledging it, the court relied on the expansive view-
point of the manufacturer's duty that served as a basis of the Larsen decision.
82 Noonan v. Buick, 211 So.2d 54 (1968). The complaint alleged that while
the owner was driving his automobile his three year old son grabbed the steering
wheel causing the automobile to skid and that the driver's seat suddenly cata-
pulted him forward and upward causing his head to strike the frame and roof of
the automobile rendering him unconscious and resulting in an accident. The
court held that the complaint stated a cause of action for negligent manufacture
of an automobile.
" Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969). An automobile
manufacturer was found to know that many users of his product will be involved
in collisions and that the incidence and extent of the injury to them will be fre-
quently determined by the placement, design and construction of such interior
components as shafts, levers, knobs, handles etc. The automobile manufacturer
owes a duty of care to reasonably minimize the risk of death or serious injury
to collision victims who, quite predictably, will upon impact be thrown against
the interior of the automobile.
"Bremier v. Volkswagen of America, 340 F. Supp. 949 (D.C. 1972). The
court refused to give a summary judgment in favor of the defendant manufac-
turer. Allegations that an automobile manufacturer defectively designed the fuel
system of an automobile and failed to give proper warning of the defect did
not involve such patent defects as would preclude recovery under a law absolving
the manufacturer from liability for negligent design when the defect is patent.
- 504 P.2d 686 (1972).
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and Larsen theories before deciding that as a matter of law no
duty exists to use reasonable care in designing an automobile to
prevent subjecting passengers to an unreasonable risk of injury in
the event of a head-on collision. The court in Ford also noted
that the possibility of crashes is within a zone of abstract forsee-
ability that is not actionable. The court acknowledged that if re-
covery were permitted in these cases it would create an undefined
area of nonliability; i.e. it is foreseeable that cars will be driven
into water, but it is dubious that a manufacturer would ever be
held liable for injuries sustained because of his vehicle's inability
to float.8" Decisions consistent with Evans have denied the existence
of a duty to construct vehicles that will maintain their structural
integrity when involved in high speed collisions,87 will be fireproof"
or will protect the driver by providing a collapsible steering wheel.
Relying on established products liability law, courts frequently
classify a defect as patent or latent before deciding the manufac-
11 504 P.2d at 690. The court acknowledged that cases applying the Larsen
principle under common law negligence standards recite that collisions with or
without the fault of the user are clearly foreseeable in normal use and will result
in injury producing impacts and that the "second collision" between the passen-
ger and the interior of the automobile are also foreseable. Hence, duty and
liability on the manufacturer in the event of faulty design. After having estab-
lished the principle of liability, however, they immediately retreat into undefined
sanctuaries of qualification that dilute the principle and add no help to its ap-
plication. For example, it excludes the collision with water that is as foreseeable
as any and occurs more frequently than some and could enhance the danger of
the automobile's use.
"Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967). The court
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment stating that the manufacturer
had no duty to design an automobile that could withstand a high speed collision
and maintain its structural integrity.
88 Schumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
This case involved an action against an automobile manufacturer for the death of
plaintiff's decedent when the automobile in which he was riding erupted into
flames after a collision. The court held that automobile manufacturers had no duty
to design vehicles to be fireproof and prevent injury to occupants when these
automobiles are involved in collisions with other objects.
89 McClung v. Ford Motor Company, 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D. W.Va. 1971).
Plaintiff was injured in a collision as a result of an impact between himself and
the steering column and steering wheel. Plaintiff based his action on the manu-
facturer's negligence in designing a vehicle that had a rigid steering wheel, rigid
steering column, unpadded steering wheel and horn rim and that the car did not
have a shoulder harness or seat lock on the rear portion of the driver's seat
to hold it in position. The court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer
stating that the complaint did not, under West Virginia law, state a claim on
which relief could be given.
turer's duty to the injured party."' A large body of case law exists
holding that sellers and manufacturers are not liable when the
dangers are obvious and known to the user or are a matter of
common knowledge."' The rationale adopted in Burkhard v. Short"
illustrates the tendency of courts to follow the Evans rule when
patent defects are involved but to follow the Larsen rule of duty
when latent defects are involved. In making this patent-latent dis-
tinction, courts take judicial notice of the size, weight and struc-
ture of the product. Accordingly, a Wisconsin court refused re-
covery in a crashworthiness action brought by the purchaser of a
Volkswagen!' holding that purchasers of Volkswagens must realize
the injurious consequences of head-on collisions with larger ve-
hicles, i.e. the patent nature of the vehicle's inability to withstand
collisions prevents recovery.
A plaintiff bringing an aviation crashworthiness action based
on negligence in design of the aircraft will logically be compelled
to prove the same elements required in a similar suit against an
automobile manufacturer. The particular jurisdiction's view of the
manufacturer's duty as a matter of law will be the most important
consideration in achieving recovery. Jurisdictions following the
Evans restrictive view will not permit recovery because the aircraft
manufacturer only has a duty to design the aircraft to be reasonably
fit for the purpose for which it was made which does not include
crashes. The manufacturer will not in the absence of legislative
mandate be required to make the plane accident proof, fool-proof
or otherwise capable of withstanding collisions. In jurisdictions
that follow the expansive view of the manufacturer's duty set out
in Larsen, however, recovery in negligent design suits will be more
probable. This view of the duty will include an obligation to design
the product so that it will fairly meet any emergency during use that
can reasonably be anticipated. The manufacturer will be respon-
sible for protecting the passenger against death and injury from
accidents that are expected and foreseeable yet unavoidable. Air-
craft are designed to be flown at great speeds and high altitudes.
'*W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 96 at 649 (4th ed. 1971).
11d. at nn.82-84.
9228 Ohio App.2d 141, 275 N.E.2d 632 (1971). A manufacturer owes no
duty to a passenger injured by contact with an obviously unpadded dashboard
that could have been made safer by padding or recessing it.
9 Enders v. Volks Wagen-Werk, 2 CCH 1972 PROD. LIAn. REP. 5 5930 (1968).
1973] NOTES
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Prior experience has shown that this "intended use" cannot be
carried out without a certain percentage of accidents; the manu-
facturer should not be allowed to claim that he did not intend the
aircraft to be involved in crashes when it could easily be foreseen.
Manufacturers of the smaller aircraft employed in general avia-
tion could be subjected to liability in negligent crashworthiness
actions under the Larsen rationale more frequently than the man-
ufacturers of larger commercial craft. The majority of aviation
accidents and deaths result from crashes of small aircrafte; there-
fore, their involvement in collisions can more easily be foreseen.
The patent-latent distinction becomes important in general avia-
tion situations also. Since World War I, the increased danger of
flying smaller aircraft has been recognized.' It is a well known
fact that the human body can withstand the impact of a crash if
it is protected by a structure that reduces the impact and distributes
its force." Thus, one of the first premises of air safety is that the
larger and heavier hull structures protect the passengers by better
absorbing and distributing the shock of the impact. Analogy can
easily be made to automobile cases denying liability when a patent
defect, the size and weight of the vehicle, prevents recovery."
IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether a crashworthiness suit is maintained on
concepts of warranty, strict liability or negligence, the question of
the manufacturer's duty inheres either directly or indirectly. Im-
plied warranty suits indirectly rely on the manufacturer's duty
when considering whether a product is merchantable or fit for a
particular purpose. The crucial determination of whether a product
is defective or unreasonably dangerous in terms of strict liability
can only be made within established parameters of the duty owed
by manufacturers and suppliers to consumers. The crashworthiness
actions based on negligence in design directly and openly focus
on the manufacturer's duty. In affirming an expansive view of the
duty owed by a manufacturer to his consumer, an Illinois appellate
court cited the rationale of Larsen v. General Motors as the most
'"J. WARFORD, GENERAL AVIAnON: WHO SHOULD PAY (1971).
" See note 9 supra.
00 Id.
O'See note 93 supra.
cogent and reasoned approach to the difficult problem of the
design defect:
To hold otherwise... would permit the manufacturer in the face
of the high incidence of injuries sustained by those injured in...
accidents, to fill the passenger compartment with all sorts of sharp
protrusions and gimcracks capable of producing severe injuries or
death and which serve no other purpose than eye appeal and then
survey the resulting misery with the complacent knowledge that
since these items of hardware did not initiate the chain of events,
it was secure from responsibility. 8
Although this mandate was directed to the automobile industry,
the same rationale should apply to the manufacturers of aircraft.
To charge the manufacturer of an automobile with a duty to guard
against collision-enhanced injuries, but to refuse to charge manu-
facturers of aircraft with the same duty presents an anamolous
result in light of both the relevant facts and applicable law. There
is no basis for distinguishing between automobiles and aircraft
when considering the manufacturer's liability for design enhanced
injuries. Although it is true that an automobile only moves within
a two-dimensional zone, the fact that the operation of an aircraft
involves a third altitudinal dimension should not relieve aviation
manufacturers of the duty to make their aircraft as safe as possible.
If anything, the additional dimension of altitude, with its attendent
dangers, should serve to increase the duty owed by producers of
aircraft. It cannot be denied that general aviation is more analagous
to the automobile situation than commercial aviation. The size
and structure of small planes is comparable to the construction of
present day automobiles. Also, the federal regulations applicable
to general aviation and the automobile industry are less stringent
than those applicable to commercial aviation. The promulgators
of federal air regulations have recently taken great care to minimize
injuries and deaths resulting from crashes of large aircraft. Thus,
it is conceivable that producers of large aircraft would not have
breached the duty owed to prospective passengers if they were in
full compliance with the appropriate federal directives. Neverthe-
less, aviation crashworthiness actions should not be summarily
precluded against the manufacturer of either small or large aircraft
" Mieher v. Brown, 2 CCH 1972 PROD. Lisa. REP. 5 6752 at 11,273 (1972).
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on the basis of an absence of a duty or on the dimensions of the
use of the product.
Finally, social necessity demands the existence of crashworthi-
ness or second collision actions against aviation manufacturers.
Otherwise, passengers are helpless to protect themselves against
injuries sustained during aviation disasters. Aviation manufactur-
ers are also in a position to allocate equally the costs incurred from
research and testing required to improve the safety aspects of their
aircraft. In the absence of crashworthiness actions, tighter federal
aviation regulations for general aviation or legislation firmly estab-
lishing the manufacturer's duty to employ the safest design possible,
those who find it necessary or convenient to travel in air traffic are
at the mercy of the manufacturer and his negligently designed
"gimcrack" encrusted aircraft.
Douglas A. Harrison
